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Constitutional Law-Labor Law-JURY TRIAL FOR CRIMINAL
CONTEMPT-18 U.S.C. § 3692-LIMITED TO NORRIS-LAGUARDIA
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975)
An injunction has issued in an industrial dispute. It is charged
that it has been violated. If the judge himself assumes to deter-
mine whether it has been or has not been, he can scarcely hope
to make a decision that will not subject him to the charge, if he
finds the prisoner guilty, of subserviency to the capitalistic inter-
ests or hostility to organized labor, or if he shall acquit, to
pusillanimity or the ambition of the demagogue. In either case
his court suffers in the estimation of no inconsiderable body of
citizens. How much wiser it would be to call in a jury . .. .
The right to a jury trial2 in a criminal contempt3 proceeding 4
51 CONG. REC. 14,369 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh during debate on the Clayton
Act).
2 The history of the jury trial in the United States was briefly outlined in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-57 (1968).
a Contempt can be generally defined as an act of disobedience or disrespect toward
a judicial or legislative body of government, or interference with its orderly process,
for which a summary punishment is usually exacted. In a broader, more general
view, it is a power assumed by governmental bodies to coerce cooperation, and
punish criticism or interference even of a causally indirect nature ....
R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1 (1963).
Contempt is in turn subdivided and classified by the courts and legal scholars into
categories such as civil and criminal, direct and indirect, and constructive. See id. at 46-85;
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 221-30, 235-49 (1971). These
classifications have significance to the contemnor because they determine the punishment
that he receives. Id. at 241-45.
Many of the criminal procedural safeguards apply to criminal contempt, so it is an
especially important classification. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (recogniz-
ing right to jury trial if contempt is serious); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943) (no double
jeopardy); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925) (appropriate notice of the
charges); Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911) (recognizing right
not to testify against oneself and presumption of innocence).
It is almost impossible to explain criminal contempt without reference to civil contempt
by way of contrast. The Supreme Court set forth the distinctions in Gompers:
Contempts are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And "it may not
always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two
classes. It may partake of the characteristics of both." . . . It is not the fact of
punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish
between the two classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is
remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt
the sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.
221 U.S. at 441, quoting Bessett v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329 (1904).
This distinction, based on the purpose for which the sentence is imposed, is the basic
distinction upon which most scholars and courts agree. Dobbs, supra, at 235-49. One author
argues, however, that it is impossible to predict the classification in which a court will place a
given contempt. R. GOLDFARB, supra, at 66-67.
For a discussion of contempt including its history, see J. Fox, CONTEMPT OF COURT
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has long been asserted by contemnors to be a constitutionally
guaranteed right,5 but as recently as 1958, the Supreme Court
declared that "criminal contempts are not subject to a jury trial as a
matter of constitutional right."'6 The contemnor's right to a jury
only existed, if at all, as a statutory one.7 Not until 1968, in Bloom v.
Illinois," did the Court expressly9 state that there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial in cases of "serious" criminal contempt.'0 Since
Bloom, the Court has been struggling to define the requisite degree
of seriousness." Muniz v. Hoffman' 2 is the most recent case decided
by the Supreme Court in this area; this decision considered not
only the constitutional, but also the statutory right to a jury trial in a
case arising from a labor dispute.
Muniz arose out of a violation of an injunction obtained pur-
suant to the Taft-Hartley Act 3 by the Regional Director of the
National Labor Relations Board.' 4 The district court issued the
injunction to halt illegal secondary boycott activities by Local 21 of
the San Francisco Typographical Union.' 5 Local 21 and some of its
officials violated this injunction and were held to be in civil con-
tempt. Local 21 continued the secondary boycott even after the
contempt citation, however, and Local 70 then joined the boycott.' 6
(1927); R. GOLDFARB, supra; Dobbs, supra; Goldfarb, The History of ihe Contempt Power, 1961
WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1961).
4 These proceedings are governed by FED. R. CaM. P. 42.
' See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183 n.14, 191 n.2 (1958).
6 Id. at 183.
7 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970) (right to jury where contempt act constitutes separate
crime under state or federal law); 29 U.S.C. § 528 (1970) (right to jury in cases, including
contempt, arising under Landrum-Griffin Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1995 (1970) (right to jury in
certain contempt cases arising under Civil Rights Act of 1957); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(h) (1970)
(right to jury in certain contempt cases arising under 1964 Civil Rights Act); 45 U.S.C. § 439
(1970) (right to jury in contempt cases arising from violation of injunction or restraining
order issued under 45 U.S.C. § 436 (1970)).
8 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
9 Id. at 211. Although Bloom was the first case to state expressly that there is such a
right, two earlier decisions had foreshadowed this holding. See 391 U.S. at 196-97; Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 694-95 &
n.12 (1964).
10 See note 65 infra.
11 See notes 65-74 and accompanying text infra.
12 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
13 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970).
14 This was actually the second injunction arising out of the dispute; the Regional
Director of the National Labor Relations Board obtained the first pursuant to the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970), after a newspaper filed an unfair labor
practice charge related to picketing. See 422 U.S. at 456.
15 Id. at 482.
16 Id. at 457.
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Petitioners' 7 and others were then ordered to show cause why they
should not be held in civil and criminal contempt. Local 70 and
Muniz requested a jury trial on the criminal contempt charges, but
the request was denied and they were found guilty.' The sentence
of petitioner Muniz was suspended, and he was placed on proba-
tion for one year; 19 a fine of $10,000 was imposed on Local 70.20
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment."' The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari 22 and affirmed.
I
STATUTORY RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
Petitioners claimed that 18 U.S.C. § 369223 entitled them to a
jury trial in the contempt proceedings below. 24 Congress enacted
17 The petitioners were James Muniz, who was a labor union official, and Local 70. Id.
18 The criminal contempt proceedings had been severed from the civil contempt
proceedings. See id.
19 Id.
20 The fine was initially $25,000, but this was remitted by the district court based on
Local 70's subsequent obedience to the injunction. For purposes of the case, therefore, the
amount was $10,000. Id. at 457 n.1.
21 492 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1974). The threshold issues were the sufficiency and admissi-
bility of the evidence. The Ninth Circuit held that on these questions the petitioners' claims
were without merit. On the issue of the right to a jury trial under 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1970),
the Ninth Circuit held that "Congress [did not] intend its grant of equitable powers to
district courts as embodied in section 10(l) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(l), to be repealed by
the recodification of section 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. ... Id. at 934.
Relying on Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), the Ninth Circuit also held
that Muniz did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial because he received only a one
year suspended sentence. Id. at 935. Responding to whether Local 70 was constitutionally
guaranteed a jury trial, the Court stated:
Where the contemnor is a corporation, association, union or other artificial
person and a fine is the ordinary punishment, the rules become obscure.... [We
can go no further than to decide this case, and upon that basis we do not find that
the judgment of the District Court was constitutionally prohibited.
Id. at 937.
22 419 U.S. 992 (1974). The Court limited review to two questions. The first was
"[w]hether petitioners, charged with criminal contempt for an alleged violation of an
injunction issued under the National Labor Relations Act, are entitled to a trial by jury
under 18 U.S.C. § 3692." Id. And second "[w]hether Article III, Section 2 and the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution mandate a jury trial where a penalty of $25,000 is assessed
against a labor organization in a criminal contempt proceeding." Id.
23 In all cases of contempt arising under the laws of the United States governing
the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders in any case involving or growing
out of a labor dispute, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the contempt shall have been
committed.
18 U.S.C. § 3692 1970).
24 422 U.S. at 457.
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this section during the 1948 revision of the criminal code,25 and at
the same time repealed 29 U.S.C. § 111.26 The Revisers' Notes27
explain that section 3692 is based on section 11128 which was a
codification of part of the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 9 whose purpose
was to protect organized labor from the federal judiciary by limit-
ing the courts' jurisdiction in labor matters.3 0 Section 111 partially
accomplished this objective by creating an exception to the historic
rule that there was no right to a jury trial in cases of criminal
contempt.3 1
Although section 3692 is based on section 111, it contains new
language. Section 111 clearly applied only to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act; section 3692 on its face applies to all cases of contempt arising
"under the laws of the United States" and "growing out of a labor
dispute. 3 2 The statutory construction issue in Muniz arose from
this apparent broadening of the meaning of the statute. 3
Subsequent to the enactment of section 111, but prior to the
1948 revision of the criminal code, Congress passed the Wagner
22 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 844. One case has since held that § 3692 does
not apply to civil contempt because it was recodified as part of the criminal code. See
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 380 F.2d 570, 579 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 327 (1967).
21 Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 111, 47 Stat. 70. See note 28 infra.
27 H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A176 (1947).
28 In all cases arising under sections 101-115 of this title in which a person shall be
charged with contempt in a court of the United States ... the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the contempt shall have been committed ....
Act of Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 111, 47 Stat. 70.
29 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1970), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of
Mar. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70).
30 "[The Norris-LaGuardia] Act was intended to shield the organized labor movement
from the intervention of a federal judiciary perceived by some as hostile to labor." 422 U.S.
at 478 (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the Supreme
Court stated:
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive to a situation totally different from that
which exists today. In the early part of this century, the federal courts generally
were regarded as allies of management in its attempt to prevent the organization
and strengthening of labor unions; and in this industrial struggle the injunction
became a potent weapon that was wielded against the activities of labor groups. The
result was a large number of sweeping decrees, often issued ex parte, drawn on an ad
hoc basis without regard to any systematic elaboration of national labor policy.
Id. at 250 (footnotes omitted).
31 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958).
32 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1970). See notes 23, 28 supra.
33 The Supreme Court had held prior to the enactment of § 3692 that § 111 did not
apply to all contempt proceedings arising out of labor disputes. United States v. UMW, 330
U.S. 258, 298 (1947).
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Act 34 and the Labor Management Relations Act,35 of which the
Taft-Hartley Act is a part. These two acts made it clear that the
procedural limitations of Norris-LaGuardia do not apply to them.36
The question was-even though the Court did not phrase it this
way-whether the right to a jury trial, as provided by section 3692,
is limited to contempts arising under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or
whether it also extends to labor legislation enacted subsequent to
that Act.37
The Supreme Court, in resolving a conflict among the cir-
cuits, 38 held that section 3692 is limited to those contempts arising
out of Norris-LaGuardia actions.3 9 Justice White, writing for five
members of the Court, first considered whether Congress, when it
passed the Taft-Hartley Act, intended to extend the right to a jury
trial to contempt proceedings arising out of Taft-Hartley viola-
tions.40 After considerable analysis of the legislative history,41 he
34 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-62 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat.
499).
35 29 U.S.C. §9 141-44, 151-68, 171-82, 185-87 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June
23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136).
36 The Labor Management Relations Act provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he jurisdiction
of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by sections 101 to 115 of this title." 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(h) (1970). The Wagner Act is less specific, but it provides, in pertinent part: "[T]he
district court shall have jurisdiction ... notwithstanding any other provision of law .... " 29
U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970).
" Although the Court actually answered this question, Justice White, in his analysis,
chose to approach the problem less directly. See notes 38-48 and accompanying text infra.
38 Actually, only one case had held that § 3692 extended to Taft-Hartley violations. See
In re Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 502 F.2d 113, 121 (1st Cir. 1974). The vast majority
of cases restricted § 3692 to Norris-LaGuardia situations. See United States v. Robinson, 449
F.2d 925, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1971) (suit for injunctive relief against employees of federal
agency); Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 380 F.2d 570,
579-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 327 (1967) (proceeding under 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88);
Madden v. Grain Elevator Workers Local 418, 334 F.2d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 967 (1965) (proceeding under Taft-Hartley Act); NLRB v. Red Arrow
Freight Lines, 193 F.2d 979, 980 (5th Cir. 1952) (proceeding brought for violation of § 7 of
the Wagner Act, now 29 U.S.C. § 157); In re Piccinini, 35 F.R.D. 548 (W.D. Pa. 1964)
(proceeding brought for violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(2), (a)(5)
(1970)); Mitchell v. Barbee Lumber Co., 35 F.R.D. 544 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (proceeding
brought for violation of Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970)); Schauffler v.
Longshoremen Local 1291, 189 F. Supp. 737, 741-42 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd on other grounds, 292
F.2d 182 (3d Cir. 1961) (proceeding under Taft-Hartley Act).
" "[S]ection 3692 does not provide for trial by jury in contempt proceedings brought to
enforce an injunction issued at the behest of the [National Labor Relations] Board in a labor
dispute arising under the Labor Management Relations Act.". 422 U.S. at 474 (footnote
omitted).
40 Justice White defined the question in these terms:
The crucial issue is whether in enacting the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts,
Congress not only intended to exempt the injunctions they authorized from
Norris-LaGuardia's limitations, but also intended that civil and criminal contempt
[Vol. 61:478
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concluded that Congress did not so intend.42 This point was not
actually in dispute, however, because the petitioners conceded that
until Congress enacted section 3692, in 1948, there was no right to
a jury trial in contempt cases arising out of Taft-Hartley viola-
tions.43
The majority opinion next analyzed the legislative history of
section 3692 to determine whether Congress intended it to make a
substantive change in existing law.4 According to the majority,
there was no manifestation of such an intent.45 Furthermore,
Justice White argued that the legislative history contained various
statements to the contrary.46 Applying the principle that there
must be a clear expression of intent to make a substantive change
in the law before a change will be read into a revision or codifica-
tion,47 the Court concluded that the statement in the Revisers'
Notes that section 3692 is "based on section 111" 48 meant that it
merely recodified section 111.
Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the phrase "based on
section 111" meant that Congress reaffirmed the "purpose" of
section 111 and extended the jury trial right to all criminal con-
tempt proceedings arising out of a "labor dispute." 49 This argu-
ment, however, is not persuasive, especially in light of the proposed
Ball Amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act.50 That amendment
proceedings enforcing those injunctions were not to afford contemnors the right to
a jury trial.
Id. at 461.
41 See 422 U.S. at 467-74.
42 422 U.S. at 461-67. The thrust of his argument was that "[bly providing for labor
injunctions outside the framework of Norris-LaGuardia Congress necessarily contemplated
that there would be no right to a jury trial in contempt cases [arising from those in-
junctions]." Id. at 463-64.
41 From the effective date of Taft-Hartley in late summer, 1947, until June 28,
1948, the effective date of the new § 3692, an alleged contemnor of a Taft-Hartley
injunction would probably have been denied the jury trial guaranteed by [29 U.S.C.
§ 111 (1940)] because the injunction would not have been one arising under
Norris-LaGuardia itself.
Brief for Petitioners at 41, Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
44 The petitioners' claim, that § 3692 granted them a jury trial, would necessarily imply
that enactment of that statute constituted a substantive change in the law.
45 422 U.S. at 474.
46 Id. at -467-74.
47 Id. at 470, citing Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 162 (1972), Fourco
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957), and United States v. Ryder,
110 U.S. 729, 740 (1884).
48 H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A176 (1947).
49 422 U.S. at 478.
50 As Senator Ball explained his amendment:
[ X]hen the regional attorney of the NLRB seeks an injunction the Norris-
LaGuardia Act is completely suspended .... We do not go quite that far in our
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would have given contemnors under the Act the same right to a
jury trial as existed under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, but the
amendment was defeated just one year prior to the enactment of
section 3692.51
Justice Stewart, in his dissent, avoided this issue and argued
that on its face section 3692 would clearly grant a jury trial to the
petitioners in Muniz. 52 He then searched for an express prohibition
of such an interpretation, which he did not find.5 3 Concluding that
a literal interpretation of the statute was permissible, Justice
Stewart argued that there should have been a jury trial because this
was clearly a labor dispute within the meaning of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the Labor Management Relations Act.54 Justice
Stewart supported his argument by citing the well-known rule that
any doubts about the meaning of criminal statutes are to be
resolved in favor of the accused. 55 The cases he cites, however, are
not strong support for his contention because they are factually
distinguishable from Muniz.56
amendment. We simply provide that the Norris-LaGuardia Act shall not apply, with
certain exceptions. We leave in effect the provisions of sections 11 and 12. Those
are the sections which give an individual charged with contempt of court the right
to a jury trial.
93 CONG. REC. 4834 (1947) (remarks of Senator Ball).
51 93 CONG. REc. 5118 (1947).
52 See 422 U.S. at 481-84.
53 Id. at 484-86. As Justice Stewart stated:
The revisers did not say that § 3692 was intended to be merely a recodification of
§ 11 of the Nris-LaGuardia Act. Rather, the revisers said that the section was
"based on" § 11 and then noted without additional comment the change in
language from reference to specific sections of Norris-LaGuardia to the more
inclusive "laws of the United States .... " In contrast, although the recodification of
18 U.S.C. § 402, dealing with contempts constituting crimes, was also "based on"
prior law, the revisers specifically noted that "[iln transferring these sections to this
title and consolidating them numerous changes in phraseology were necessary
which do not, however, change their meaning or substance."
Id. at 484-85, quoting H.R. REP. No. 304, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A176, A30 (footnote omitted).
54 Id. at 482-83.
55 1i at 487, citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971), Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971), and Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959).
51 In United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971), the Supreme Court considered part of
Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1)
(1970), a statute which, unlike § 3692 of Title 18, defines a crime. It was ambiguous whether
the indictment under § 1202 need allege and the government need prove that the firearm
had been possessed "in commerce or affecting commerce," so the Court reversed the
conviction. The Court held that a statute which defines a crime and which is ambiguous is to
be construed in favor of the defendant.
The case of Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971), held that part of the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970), which prohibits interstate travel in furtherance of criminal
activity, did not apply to some residents of Georgia who had visited Florida and placed some
bets. Here it was also debatable xihether or not the statute made the particular activity a
crime, so the Supreme Court construed it in favor of the defendants.
In Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1 (1959), the question was whether petitioners,
[Vol. 61:478
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II
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The constitutional right to a jury trial in criminal contempt
proceedings has received much attention from the Supreme Court
in recent years. In 1958, the Court found that there was no such
right.57 Six years later, in Cheff v. Schnackenberg,58 the Court,
affirming a six-month conviction for criminal contempt, stated:
alleged to have violated the Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV,
1974), had to be prosecuted by indictment, as required by FED. R. CRuM. P. 7(a). The Court
held that the rule could not be waived without doing violence to the substantial right
involved.
Each of these decisions is clearly distinguishable from the principal case. The first two
dealt with statutes which ambiguously defined crimes, and the third concerned a rule of
procedure which arguably did not permit the defendant to waive a substantial right. Muniz,
on the other hand, dealt with the legislative grant of a right to a jury trial.
.1 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). This case arose after two persons,
convicted of conspiracy to violate the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2385 (1970), and released
on bail, failed to surrender to the United States Marshall when ordered to do so. In criminal
contempt proceedings they were found guilty of willfully disobeying the order to surrender
and were given three year sentences. Id. at 167-68.
On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that:
The statements of this Court in a long and unbroken line of decisions involving
contempts ranging from misbehavior in court to disobedience of court orders
establish beyond peradventure that criminal contempts are not subject to jury trial
as a matter of constitutional right.
Id. at 183 (footnote omitted). Justice Frankfurter even went so far as to include in his
concurring opinion a list of all of the past Justices who had supported the summary use of
this power. Id. at 192. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the majority opinion was
surprising in light of the book he had coauthored many years earlier which had catalogued
many of the abuses of the use of the summary contempt power. See F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1-134 (1930).
The dissenters in Green, however, argued:
If ever a group of cases called for reappraisal it seems to me that those
approving summary trial of charges of criminal contempt are the ones. The early
precedents which laid the groundwork for this line of authorities were decided
before the actual history of the procedures used to punish contempt was brought to
light, at a time when "[w]holly unfounded assumptions about 'immemorial usage'
acquired a factitious authority and were made the basis of legal decisions." These
cases erroneously assumed that courts had always possessed the power to punish all
contempts summarily and that it inhered in their very being without supporting
their suppositions by authority or reason. Later cases merely cite the earlier ones in
a progressive cumulation, while uncritically repeating their assumptions about
"immemorial usage" and "inherent necessity."
Id. at 196 (Black, J., dissenting opinion), quoting Frankfurter & Landis, Power to Regulate
Contempts, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1011 (1924).
58 384 U.S. 373 (1966). Cheff, a former president and chairman of the board of the
Holland Furnace Company, was sentenced to six months imprisonment for criminal con-
tempt of a cease-and-desist order against certain company selling practices. Id. at 375-76.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, limiting review to the question of whether a sentence
of imprisonment of six months was constitutionally permissible under article III and the
sixth amendment of the Constitution. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 382 U.S. 917 (1965).
Furthermore, the Court denied Holland Furnace Company's petition for review of the
$100,000 fine imposed on it. Holland Furnace Co. v. Schnakenberg, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
1976]
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[I]n the exercise of the Court's supervisory power and under the
peculiar power of the federal courts to revise sentences in con-
tempt cases, we rule further that sentences exceeding six months
for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts
absent a jury trial or waiver thereof.5 9
Two years later, the Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana, ° which
extended the sixth amendment guaranty of the right to a jury
trial 6' for serious criminal offenses to state proceedings, 62 and
Bloom v. Illinois,6 3 which held that "convictions for criminal con-
tempt are indistinguishable from ordinary criminal convictions, for
their impact on the individual defendant is the same. ' 64 According
to the Court inBloom, the criminal contemnor has the same right to a
jury trial as other criminals. In so holding, the Court stated: "By
deciding to treat the criminal contempt like other crimes insofar as
the right to a jury trial is concerned, we similarly place it under the
rule that petty crimes need not be tried to a jury. '65 This im-
mediately raised the question of what is a "petty" criminal contempt,
a variation on the old question of what is a serious and what is a petty
crime.66
59 384 U.S. at 380.
60 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Duncan was convicted of a simple battery, which under
Louisiana law was a misdemeanor punishable by up to a $300 fine and imprisonment for two
years, and was sentenced to serve 60 days and was fined $150. He had demanded ajury trial.
However, under the Louisiana Constitution a jury trial was granted only when capital
punishment or imprisonment at hard labor could be imposed. Id. at 146.
61 The Court reversed the lower court's conviction of Duncan and held that the
fourteenth amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial in all criminal cases that would be
"serious" if tried in the federal courts. Id. at 149.
62 See note 65 infra.
63 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Defendant Bloom was convicted of criminal contempt of an
Illinois state court for willfully petitioning to admit a will falsely prepared and executed after
the death of the purported testator; he was sentenced to two years' imprisonment under -n
Illinois .law which provided no maximum sentence for contempt. He had made a timely
demand for a jury trial, but this was refused. Id. at 195.
64 Id. at 201.
65 Id. at 210. The notion that there is a right to a jury trial in the case of a "serious" but
not a "petty" crime has its origin in the common law. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160
(1968). The rationale for this distinction is that "the possible consequences to defendants
from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits
to efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the
availability of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications." Id.
The problem is that "the boundaries of the petty offense category have always been
ill-defined, if not ambulatory." Id. This, of course, has resulted in much confusion and
litigation since courts have merely characterized offenses as either serious or petty without
establishing standards for future determinations. See, e.g., Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418
U.S. 506, 512 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-50 (1969); Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968). See generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty
Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917 (1926);
Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CH. L. REV. 245 (1959).
66 See note 65 supra.
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In distinguishing between petty and serious crimes, the Court
has sought to use objective criteria whenever possible. 67 The
criteria usually employed include "the nature of the offense it-
self'68 and "the severity of the maximum authorized penalty.169
However, these are usually of little help in the case of criminal
contempt. The Court explained in Bloom that criminal contempt is
not in and of itself a "serious offense,17 0 so "the nature of the
offense" is not a useful criterion in these types of cases. Further-
more, "the severity of the maximum authorized penalty" is not
helpful in most cases because legislatures seldom impose a
maximum penalty for criminal contempt.71 Therefore, the Court
has used "the severity of the penalty actually imposed on the
contemnor" as the objective criterion for distinguishing petty from
serious criminal contempt.7 2
The Court, using this criterion, decided a series of cases which.
provide guidelines for the distinction between serious and petty
67 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617, 625-28 (1937).
1s It would seem that the "nature of the offense" is a subjective test since there are no
guidelines to aid in this determination; in any case, the Court has applied this test a number
of times. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (engaging in business
of selling secondhand personal property without license is of relatively inoffensive moral
quality); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930) (driving automobile so as to
endanger property and individuals a grave offense); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65
(1904) (knowing purchase for sale of oleomargarine not properly stamped not an offense
necessarily involving moral delinquency); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (conspiracy
to prevent members of musicians union from pursuing their trade anywhere in United
States an offense of grave character).
60 The theory behind this criterion is that the penalty imposed by the legislature is a
reflection of how seriously society views the crime. The Court, of course, then decides whether
this judgment makes the crime serious enough to require a jury trial. See, e.g., Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) (no offense could be deemed petty where imprisonment for
more than six months authorized); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (crime of
simple battery, a misdemeanor punishable by fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment
of two years, or both, held a serious crime); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968) (alleged criminal contemnors not entitled to jury trial where maximum penalty under
state law is 10 days in jail and $50 fine); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)
(punishment of up to 90 day imprisonment or a $300 fine for engaging in business without a
license does not bring it into class of major offenses); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65
(1904) (federal statute imposing $50 fine for violation held a petty offense).
70 The Court held that "criminal contempt is not a crime of the sort that requires the
right to jury trial regardless of the penalty involved." 391 U.S. at 211.
7' See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968).
72 See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
162 n.35 (1968). This approach has been criticized because it suggests as a criterion for
choosing appropriate procedural safeguards, which must be imposed from the beginning of
the proceeding, a determination that will not be known until the end of the proceeding-the
actual sentence imposed. Sitzer, Direct Criminal Contempt of Court-The Jury Requirement, 18
ST. Louis U.L.J. 96, 105 (1973).
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criminal contempt. These guidelines may best be summarized in the
Supreme Court's own language:
[L]acking legislative authorization of more serious punishment, a
sentence of as much as six months in prison, plus normal periods
of probation, may be imposed without a jury trial . . . but
imprisonment for longer than six months is constitutionally im-
permissible unless the contemnor has been given the opportunity
for a jury trial. 73
However, prior to Muniz the Court had not fashioned guidelines as
to what would constitute a serious or a petty criminal contempt
when the punishment was a fine rather than imprisonment.74
Muniz was the first case in which the Court considered whether
or not the imposition of a fine for criminal contempt, unaccom-
panied by imprisonment, requires a jury trial if the defendant
demands one.75 Local 7076 claimed that a $10,000 fine77 was not
petty,7s and that it was therefore constitutionally entitled to a jury
trial.79 However, the majority concluded that the fine imposed was
not "a deprivation of such magnitude that a jury should have been
interposed to guard against bias or mistake. 80 This upheld the
Ninth Circuit's finding that there was no constitutional right to a
jury trial in this situation. 81
It is difficult to summarize the test that emerges from Muniz.
The test suggested by the majority opinion is to determine "the
seriousness of the risk and the extent of the possible deprivation
faced by a contemnor. ''8 2 Presumably, if the seriousness of the risk
and the extent of the possible deprivation are significant, the
contemnor is entitled to a jury trial. This test seems simple enough,
but its meaning is vague because the Court provided no definitions
and few guidelines for determining the seriousness of the risk or
73 422 U.S. at 476.
74 This is not to be confused with the issue of whether or not a fine is considered
excessive. See, e.g., United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05 (1947).
75 422 U.S. at 476.
76 Local 70 is an unincorporated union of some 13,000 members. Id. at 477.
7 See note 20 supra.
7' Local 70 argued that "petty" was defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970). 422 U.S. at 476. That
section of the criminal code states: "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both, is a petty
offense." 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1970).
7' Muniz did not appeal on constitutional grounds because his one year suspended
sentence was clearly constitutionally permissible. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,
151 (1969) (three year suspended sentence without jury trial permissible).
80 422 U.S. at 477.
81 Hoffman v. Teamsters Local 70, 492 F.2d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1974). See note 21 supra.
82 422 U.S. at 477.
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the extent of possible deprivation. This vagueness, of course,
makes the test flexible, but precise analysis is elusive.
The majority is apparently confused about the "seriousness of
the risk" test. The Court seems to use the term "risk"83 in a manner
similar to the way it uses the criterion of "maximum authorized
penalty"84 in making the distinction between serious and petty
crimes. Further analysis, however, shows that in the case of a
criminal contempt fine imposed after the proceedings, the "risk"
merges with the "possible deprivation" and the latter becomes the
only relevant criterion. 85
The one factor that the Court suggested was important in this
case was the number of dues-paying members of the union. 86 In
general terms, this means the economic resources of the union, but
it is at this point that the test becomes unclear. The extent of the
contemnor's resources is compared to the size of the fine. Thus
"deprivation" is a relative term: a fine of $10,000 may or may not
be deprivation of such magnitude as to require a jury trial, depend-
ing on the particular defendant.8 7
This is quite unlike the other tests for "serious" and "petty."
The other tests examine either the nature of the offense commit-
ted, the possible maximum penalty, or the penalty actually im-
posed.88 Only the Muniz test looks at the nature of the defendant;
it is remarkable because it makes the constitutional right to a jury
trial of the criminal contemnor who is fined dependent on his
13 Justice White stated that "it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a $501 fine
would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union." Id.
84 See note 69 supra. The Court certainly did not mean "chances of conviction" when it
used the term "risk." That would mean that the test requires essentially a determination of
guilt before a decision could be made as to the need for a jury. Nor did the Court mean the
risk of a biased or mistaken judicial decision. See notes 102-05 and accompanying text infra.
Had the majority intended this as the meaning of "risk," "seriousness of the risk" would have
had content as a separate factor. See note 85 infra. The constitutional test emerging from
this case would then have been direct and clear. As it now stands, the test has two parts
which on their face seem different but which actually are the same.
85 "Seriousness of the risk" in the context of the test of this case is not meaningful as a
separate factor. It can only be determined relative to the contemnor-a fine is a "risk" to the
defendant that can be measured by making a comparison between the size of the fine and his
wealth. Therefore, it is actually the same as the "possible deprivation faced by a contem-
nor." The Court implicitly recognized this since in its conclusion it spoke only of the
'magnitude of the deprivation" faced by the union. 422 U.S. at 477.
88 Although the number of dues-paying union members was dearly a factor in the
Court's decision, the majority was unwilling to directly admit this. Justice White stated that
"[this union, the Government suggests, collects dues from some 13,000 persons .... " 422 U.S.
at 477 (emphasis added).
87 This seems to suggest that there is no absolute amount of fine which will make the
contempt one which is considered serious.
" See notes 67-69 and accompanying text supra.
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economic status. The Court said, in effect, that there was no need
to interpose a jury to "guard against bias or mistake" because
$10,000 was not a large sum to the union.8 9 This, however, seems
contrary to all notions of due process and equal protection. In a
series of cases involving indigent defendants, the Supreme Court
has held that the wealth of the defendant is not a proper criterion
for determining his constitutional rights. 90 Local 70 was clearly not
indigent, and this factor may explain the Court's decision in Muniz.
Regardless of the explanation, however, this opinion creates an
unusual basis for determining a defendant's constitutional rights.
Moreover, the Court did not mention any other factors which
should go into the determination of the right to a jury trial.
Justice Douglas in the lone dissent on this issue did not discuss
the test formulated by the majority. He objected to the concep-
tual serious-petty distinction 9' and argued that there is a right to a
jury trial in all cases of criminal contempt.92 He also argued that, in
89 Justice Douglas disputed this point, stating that "a $10,000 fine is not a matter most
locals would take lightly." 422 U.S. at 480 (dissenting opinion).
90 See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The Muniz test is surprising in light of these and other precedents. Justice Black best
summarized this line of cases by declaring that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 19 (1956). Griffin held unconstitutional, on due process and equal protection
grounds, a state procedure that in effect precluded appellate review by denying free
transcripts to indigent defendants.
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), struck down the Virginia
$1.50 poll tax as a violation of equal protection. The Supreme Court stated that "[l]ines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race... are traditionally disfavored."
Id. at 668 (citation omitted).
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1953), the Court held unconstitutional, as a
violation of the fourteenth amendment, a state procedure which denied counsel to virtually
all indigents' appeals. In reaching its decision, the Court stated that "there can be no equal
justice where the kind of appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.'"
Id. at 335, quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), involved Connecticut's refusal to permit the
institution of divorce actions without the payment of court fees and service-of-process costs.
The Supreme Court held this was a denial of due process since it prevented many indigents
from obtaining divorces. And in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972), a statutory
candidate filing fee scheme was held to be a denial of equal protection because it excluded
poor but otherwise qualified individuals from being listed on the ballot. See Nowak,
Realigning the Standards of Review under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and
Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974); 2 ST. MARY's L.J. 251 (1970); 45 Miss. L.J.
467 (1974).
91 422 U.S. at 480 (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion). The other dissenters would have
granted a jury trial under § 3692 and did not discuss the constitutional issue. Id. at 481-89
(Stewart, J., dissenting opinion).
92 Id. at 480 (Douglas, J., dissenting opinion).
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any event, a fine of $10,000 would place the contempt in the
"serious" category 93
III
EFFECT OF REFUSAL TO GRANT A JURY TRIAL
The Court applied a very narrow interpretation to the seem-
ingly broad provisions of section 3692. 94 Unless Congress changes
the statute, or clearly indicates a contrary intention, the Court's
decision will be controlling.9 5
By restricting the application of section 3692 to the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, Justice White confined it to an area of the law
described as "obsolescing" 9 6-most labor injunctions are now ini-
tiated by the NLRB pursuant to the Labor Management Relations
Act because it is relatively harder for employers to obtain injunc-
tions under the Norris-LaGuardia provisions.9 7 Thus, in the ma-
jority of labor disputes, criminal contemnors will not automatically
have the statutory option of a jury trial, and they will have to
commit a serious contempt before they will have a constitutional
right. As a practical matter, this will supply judges with consider-
able control over parties to such disputes because the seriousness of
the criminal contempt will be decided after the fact on the basis of
the penalty imposed.
The Muniz analysis of the constitutional right to a jury trial
marks the first time that the Court has established guidelines in this
area. The test is difficult to use-it would have been clearer had the
Court simply stated that a fine of more than a certain amount
makes the contempt serious.9 8 Also, the test is sufficiently vague so
that further litigation will be necessary to delineate the factors that
determine "the seriousness of the risk" and the "magnitude of the
deprivation."9 9 Even though the test itself is vague, the general
93 See note 89 supra.
04 See note 23 supra.
95 It is unlikely that Congress will modify the statute. As early as 1952 the courts had
held that § 3692 did not apply to contempts arising out of violations of statutes other than
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See NLRB v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, 193 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.
1952). During the intervening period of more than two decades, Congress did not change
the law. Furthermore, now that the Bloom decision constitutionally guarantees a jury trial for
all "serious" criminal contempt cases, there should not be such strong pressures for change.
06 See In re Union Nacional de Trabaadores, 502 F.2d 113, 119 (lst Cir. 1974).
'7 See id.
98 This would have made the test similar to the rule governing criminal contempt cases
where the punishment is imprisonment. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
99 See notes 82-88 and accompanying text supra.
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meaning of Muniz is clear: there is no constitutional right to a jury
trial as long as the judge imposes a fine which is not large relative
to the economic strength of the contemnor.
The most immediate and practical effect of Muniz will be felt
by unions and employers in labor disputes. Criminal contemnors in
such controversies (except those arising out of Norris-LaGuardia
situations) will have no more and no fewer rights to a jury trial
than other criminal contemnors. The holding that the imposition
of large fines does not per se require a jury trial should encourage
the summary use of the fine in labor injunction cases.' 00 It is
doubtful that the results will be as dire as predicted by some, 10 but
this case will certainly be interpreted as a signal for judges to use
their summary power to control labor injunction contemnors. Be-
cause of the size of fines permissible after Muniz, that power is
great indeed.
More important, this case may exacerbate the hostility that has
historically existed between the federal judiciary and organized
labor. 10 2 It was because of this hostility that Congress interposed a
jury between the judge and the union by the enactment of section
3692 and its predecessor. 0 3 The jury has since guarded against
bias or mistake of judges who become too personally involved in
the case and has considerably eased the previous tension. 04 By
removing the protection that a jury affords a union, 0 5 Muniz may
unnecessarily reopen another period of friction and tension be-
tween labor unions and the courts.
CONCLUSION
Muniz is the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of the right
to a jury trial in criminal contempt proceedings. Restricting section
3692 to the now seldom used Norris-LaGuardia statute will en-
101 See Bartosic & Lanoff, Escalating the Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 U.
CHI. L. REv. 255, 257, 280-84 (1972). These authors argued for wider use of contempt in
controlling labor disputes, calling it the "ultimate sanction . . . [that] is crucial to the
regulatory scheme of the [Taft-Hartley] Act. ... Id. at 256.
I See, e.g., Brief for Center for Constitutional Rights as Amicus Curiae at 10, Muniz v.
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
102 For a catalog of abuses of the summary contempt power, see F. FRANKFURTER & N.
GREEN, supra note 57, at 1-134. See also Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443
(1921); Loewe v. Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908); In re Debs, 158
U.S. 564 (1895).
103 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
104 See note 102 supra.
1015 The majority alluded to this protection in its discussion of the constitutional right to
ajury trial. See 422 U.S. at 477. See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-57 (1968).
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courage the use of the summary contempt power in labor disputes.
The large fines permitted by the Muniz test, and the limiting of
jury protection, may usher in another era of uneasy relationships
between the federal judiciary and labor unions. This case, fur-
thermore, signals a halt to the extension of the constitutional right
to a jury trial in cases of criminal contempt, and continues the
Supreme Court's recent assault on the jury system in general. 10 6
Michael E. Niebruegge
o See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (convictions by less-than-
unanimous jury verdicts upheld); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (less-than-
unanimous jury verdicts in criminal cases permitted); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)
(constitutional guaranty of jury trial does not require jury membership to be fixed at 12).
Cf. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973) (six man jury permitted under sevehth
amendment right to jury trial in civil cases).
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